Published in C. Psaltis, A. Gillespie & A.-N. Perret-Clermont (Eds.),
Social Relations in Human and Societal Development, pp. 215-242, 2015,
which should be used for any reference to this work

The Importance of Social Relations for Human and Societal Development

Charis Psaltis, Alex Gillespie and Anne-Nelly Perret-Clermont

Introduction

In this concluding chapter we structure a discussion around two overarching themes that we believe are pivotal in an investigation of the role of social relations for human and societal development, and three topics that correspond to the three parts of the volume. The first, overarching, and more fundamental, theme concerns the question of whether it is still relevant and useful to talk about development and not merely change in both fields. The second concerns the directionality of change from the societal to human development, a theme that is raised in the Introduction (Chapter 1).

Then we open the black box of social interaction on the three spheres of social life covered in the three corresponding parts of the volume. Part I concerned the role of social relations and social interaction in cognitive and sociomoral development. Part II looked at the role of social relations in conflict transformation and Part III focused on social relations in relation to economic structure and the recent financial crisis.

In a final section we conclude that all three parts of the volume facilitate an interdisciplinary exploration of our topic and underline the need to understand the processes of change at various levels of analysis (Doise, 1986). We also examine the ways in which microgenetic, ontogenetic and sociogenetic processes are articulated, through external and internal dialogue, and the use of both material and symbolic resources, or what Gerard Duveen saw as the vision of genetic social psychology (Zittoun et al., 2007; Gillespie & Zittoun, 2010; Moscovici et al., 2013; Psaltis & Zapiti, 2014).

Development or change?

As we argued in the Introduction, although child development is far from predictable, it is nevertheless given direction by the fact that children are socialized into a society. It is, for example, inconceivable that a child brought up in society A would end up socialized into society B. Societies, on the other hand, don't have a macroguidance structure into which they are socialized; rather, they must find their own way in the world. It is thus unsurprising that societal development is more contested than human development.

From a broad view of human development, especially from the Piagetian tradition, many studies show that more complex, powerful, reflective and decentred views in various domains of the child's capabilities are adaptive to living in a world of increasing complexity (Piaget, 1965/1968).

However, the closer we get to an examination of societal development, the more difficult such claims are to sustain. Most notably there is ideological contestation around what constitutes the ideal direction of societal change, not to mention experience of the destructive history of the 20th century and climate change due to human-made causes. The apparently less contested nature of human development might explain the international community's efforts to shift discussions of societal development away from economic growth and towards human capabilities and the factors that promote resilience or lead to vulnerabilities in human development (UNDP, 2014).

However, the direction and outcomes of human development could be contested too, especially when such individual "progress" is premised on individualism. What schools and middle-class education values as "good" development could in fact have plenty of very negative side-effects. For example, Pulfrey and Butera (2013) show how neoliberal values of self-enhancement can lead to cheating; and Pulfrey et al. (2011) demonstrate how the supposedly mature goal of being dedicated to schoolwork in order to obtain good grades could have detrimental effects. Crouzevialle and Butera (2012) have interesting results that show how the present competitive ideology, by putting pressure on the individual to outperform others, can hinder cognitive performance. This is in line with Toma and Butera's (2009) data on the differential impact of cooperation and competition on strategic information-sharing and use in group decision-making tasks. Competition is likely to hinder social interaction capabilities and, as a result, cognitive competencies.

But there is also another critique that could be made: that Piaget overestimates "abstraction" as a competence downplaying the "concrete". Hundeide (1991), for example, makes the case that education programmes in slums that socialize young people on school tasks dealing mostly with formal thinking might distract them from opportunities both to acquire the concrete skills required in the daily life of their environment and to reflect on them. This critique points to the possibility that formal operational thinking might not be a more advanced way of thinking but just a different kind of thinking. And even if the intention of this critique is just to point to a certain Western-centric point of view in Piagetian thinking, it is also worth considering whether this kind of argument could be misused to support a reified notion of culture, which ends up lowering the expectations of specific groups to learn a kind of thinking that is currently demanded for excellence in the sciences and technological innovation in any state.

There is also a methodological critique to be made. The distinction between formal reasoning and concrete operations is not so clear when dealing with complex tasks (Perret & Perret-Clermont, 2011). It is not clear what development really is, and our methodologies to declare that some child is more developed than another are constantly under fire. It also depends on what situation they are in, what rules they have to obey to according to their socialization, what the meaning of displaying competence is for the child or whether they have understood what is expected in the test situation, as clearly shown by Perret-Clermont (Chapter 4, this volume). It should be noted that the uncertainties when it comes to the idea of "learning" in the educational context are even greater: Is imitating, adopting some ideas, changing behaviour, pleasing the teacher and so on learning? How can we be sure that a student has learned? The methodological problems are numerous, especially if we care about transfer of knowledge from one context to the other (Perret-Clermont, Chapter 4; Zittoun & Perret-Clermont, 2009).

The empirical findings and interdisciplinary theoretical frameworks presented in this volume offer the basis for a more informed discussion of critiques that have also been levelled from post-structuralist, post-colonial and post-development literatures in relation to the notion of "development" itself. For example, Burman's (2008b) critique concerns both the notion of societal development and also the way in which societal development is empirically collapsed with human development at the individual level, as two sides of the same coin. This can be seen in the Human Development Reports of the United Nations Development Programme. Regarding the first type of critique, she criticizes the

following points: (1) the Euro/Western-centric view of "development", which implies a loss in diversity of the world towards a "Westernization" of increasing individualism; (2) the projection of adult–child relations of power to the North–South relations at the international level that leads to an infantilization of the South (meaning the poor countries); (3) the increasing inflation of the concept of "development" (sustainable development, human-centred development, integrated development), which leads to the word becoming empty; (4) the sanctification of development to such an extent that any foreign intervention in a poor or conflict country can lay claims to legitimacy in the name of development as a "higher good"; and (5) the capitalist and neoliberal agendas that are implemented through structural adjustment plans in the name of development but that end up intensifying the inequalities in societies.

Edelstein (1999) at the turn of the 21st century touched on the same tension in the sphere of studying the cognitive development of individuals in societies across time:

> The century has seen spells of sociopolitical, institutional, and cognitive regression on a grand scale. Progressivists today suffer from acute hangover. Complexity, it now is apparent, works both ways: increasing pressure for assimilative response is but one; destructive regression, the violent simplification of complex structures, is another. In the face of regression, it is difficult to maintain confidence in an everlasting unfolding of individual cognitive competence as an assimilative response to the ever-growing cognitive complexity of social systems.
>
> (Edelstein, 1999, p. 6)

The critique by Burman (2008b) of the way in which international organizations operationalize societal development as economic growth, longevity and academic attainment is indeed valid. The Human Development Index (HDI) (UNDP, 2014), which the international community uses as the yardstick of societal development, for example, is a crude macrostructural composite measure that is far removed from the experience, social relationships and social interactions of people.

When international organizations, as a reaction to such criticisms, shift their attention from the societal to the individual then the discourse of "skills and capabilities" takes precedence, which is redolent with the methodological individualism at the other end of the horn of the individual–social antinomy.

This is not to deny the importance or relevance of the indices and capabilities being measured. There are not many people in this world who would deny that humanity should collectively strive for healthier and more educated human beings. To be sure, to the extent that the HDI is used to channel international help where it is most needed, its use has to be applauded.

It is certainly worth discussing whether the direction of economic growth is one promoting cooperative relations and mutual respect in all spheres of life or one of deepening the inequalities produced by the capitalist and neoliberal system. An even more basic question is whether economic growth is indeed reflected in health and education in these countries. In other words, it is always worth asking: Whose development are we talking about? Who else benefits from this development? Who wants these changes? Are changes at the societal level in any way related to the development of individuals? If yes, through what processes?"

All of this leads to the conclusion that one could indeed withhold characterizations of "development" or "regression" when discussing societal change. This would maybe have the benefit of better understanding both processes of change and stability or non-transformation (Gillespie, Chapter 6; Downing Wilson & Cole, Chapter 10; Zittoun, Chapter 8) at the societal level. But at the same time we should never lose sight of potential repercussions of such stability or change for human development (Psaltis, Chapter 5).

For example, one of the major tensions of educational policy in the modern nation state comes from the inertia of its traditional role as a galvanizer of national identity, national pride and patriotism. One could debate the legitimacy or the need for stability or change regarding the goals of an educational system from the perspective of international politics and the nation state, but this should be done without losing sight of the possible negative repercussions of such decisions for the pedagogical role of the school promoting the cognitive and moral development of the child and the cultivation of a self-reflective critical thinking individual. The discussions around the aims of history teaching in nation states, for example, capture this dynamic perfectly (Makriyianni & Psaltis, 2007; Carretero, 2011; Psaltis, Chapter 5).

Bidirectionality and the need for analytical distance

In the Introduction we showed how various theoretical approaches that discuss relations between human and societal development prioritize either the individual (Inglehard & Welzel, 2004) or the social

(Greenfield, 2009). As we have seen in Part I, one answer to this tension was Jean Piaget's parallelism between cognitive development and social development. When he was asked what came first he would often reply that this amounted to the chicken and egg problem.

But what the contributors to this volume suggest is that broad parallelisms between the individual and the social, or collapsing the one over the other, can be unproductive, as long as such views leave the "black box" of social relations and social interaction unopened. In this volume, all contributions transcend individualism without at the same time taking the extreme position of sociological holism.

The authors converge on their understanding of psychological development as a social process and offer a detailed view of social relations and social interaction as what mediates between societal change and human development. This is done in a way that the importance of the notion of development, and even progress, is reinstated in Part I, when this is warranted, in relation to cognitive development in ontogenesis (Perret-Clermont, Chapter 4; Psaltis, Chapter 5) or sociomoral development (Edelstein, Chapter 2; Keller, Chapter 3). At the same time it becomes clear, as we see in the other parts of the volume, that complex sociogenetic processes relating to the economic structure of a society (Uskul, Chapter 9), changes in the social representations about alterity in times of upheaval due to financial crisis (Passini, Chapter 11) or conflict transformation (Constantinou, Chapter 7) can have formative influences on human development through the formation of social relations with specific characteristics between and within groups.

Part I

The contributors to Part I reminded us that it is worth revisiting the Piagetian tradition and Piaget's unique project of genetic epistemology going beyond the usual misinformed readings of Piagetian theory as a cognitivist and individualist "stage theorist" (Kitchener, 2009; Psaltis & Zapiti, 2014). In particular, his distinction between relations of constraint and relations of cooperation, the bedrock of his genetic epistemology that influenced Habermasian theorizing (see Psaltis, 2007), remains crucial and relevant more than 70 years after his proposal (Piaget, 1932/1965). In times of financial crisis, and increased xenophobia, racism, fascism and religious fanaticism across the globe, his vision for the promotion of social relations of cooperation and decentration away from monologic and dogmatic perspectives becomes more relevant than ever.

The crucial element in cooperative relationships is mutual respect, which translates into a norm of reciprocity and practically means a situation of social interaction where both Self and Other feel free to express their own point of view and allow the other space to express their view also (Cooper et al., 2012). Under such conditions, decentration from egocentric perceptions and consequently the co-construction of mutual understanding become possible. Reflection on the Self's actions and views is also facilitated in a social interaction premised on mutual respect. This transforms the coordination of the Self's and Other's perspectives into a new perspective-transcending representation that comprises a more equilibrated form of thinking compared with the previous one.

Piaget's Self and Other, however, were both epistemic subjects and not social psychological subjects (see Duveen's writings in Moscovici et al., 2013; Psaltis & Zapiti, 2014), which hinders our understanding of the complicated social psychological processes that mediate between societal and human development. As we saw, Piaget's vision of the promotion of social relations of cooperation is one that resonates with the contributions to all three parts of this volume, albeit in a revised form that is aware and critical of power structures, asymmetries and dynamics at various levels of analysis that might hinder (Sinclaire-Harding et al., 2013) or even, at times, paradoxically facilitate the establishment of equilibrium and cognitive development (Duveen & Psaltis, 2008; Greco Morasso et al., in press).

Wolfgang Edelstein is one of the influential figures in the study of human development who never abandoned the notion of human and societal development or even that of progress. As he argued, it is one thing to critique the claims of progressivism and limit it to a position that is compatible with a more realistic and, at the same time, dialectical view of sociocognitive progress, but it is quite another thing to abandon the notion of cognitive progress altogether (Edelstein, 1999). He maintains that societies are peopled by reasoning individuals, who have to reconstruct cognitive traditions and assimilate the schemata of their culture in their own individual but collectively validated ways.

Edelstein's contribution (Chapter 2) adds support to the aim of international organizations such as the EU, the Council of Europe and the OECD to cultivate certain capabilities for democratic citizenship and respect for human rights, but he also suggests practical steps for civic education, educational processes and practices relating to social relations and social interactions that promote these outcomes. We are reminded by Edelstein that democracy needs to be cultivated in schools

and that a crucial element of this cultivation is the promotion of cooperation. He describes strategies to provide democratic experiences and to foster social competencies in schools: classroom councils as tools for democratic self-government and as sites for cooperation and discursive sociomoral learning (Keller, Chapter 3). All of these projects are firmly rooted in the Piagetian tradition of promoting international cooperation and world peace (Perret-Clermont, Chapter 4). Edelstein additionally suggests service learning in the community, which can be successfully organized by classroom councils and early experiences of civic engagement in community contexts as part of democratic classroom practice. Such practices aim to learn about democracy, through democracy and for democracy.

From a perspective that prioritizes social relations and social interaction, it is encouraging to read in Edelstein's contribution (Chapter 2) that the OECD recognized that the cultivation of the skills, attitudes and capabilities for democracy are premised on the ability to (1) interact in socially heterogeneous groups, (2) act autonomously and (3) use tools interactively, but it is worth noting that, for the time being, these dimensions are not yet measured in the PISA studies of the OECD, as discussed earlier.

The Piagetian vision is also reasserted in the chapters by Perret-Clermont (Chapter 4) and Psaltis (Chapter 5). But this is done as part of an empirical tradition that explores the role of social interaction in cognitive development beyond the ideal forms described by Piaget, who never empirically studied the role of social interaction for cognitive development. Since the mid-1970s, when this line of research was initiated by Willem Doise, Anne-Nelly Perret-Clermont and Gabriel Mugny (Doise et al., 1976), the importance of sociocognitive conflict in social interaction as an important element for the promotion of cognitive development has been reasserted time and again (Psaltis & Zapiti, 2014). And this sociocognitive conflict is both enabled and constrained by various factors that could be described at the intrapersonal, interpersonal, intergroup and ideological/social representational level (Doise, 1986).

Perret-Clermont in her own research programme in Neuchâtel offered a critique of the methods of an underlying individual-social methodological dualism of the first generation of research in Geneva. This led her to suggest a paradigmatic shift that she described as a second generation of research (Perret-Clermont, 1993; Tartas & Perret-Clermont, 2008; Psaltis et al., 2009). The hallmark of this second generation of studies was her emphasis on the need to open the "black box" of communication. In other words, the emphasis on the outcomes of social interaction

dominant in the first generation went into the background and into the foreground came questions such as: How is intersubjectivity between the experimenter and the child constructed in the pre-test, or post-test? More recently, a third generation of research in Neuchâtel expanded its focus to the study of what was termed the study of the microhistory of individual cases moving towards the direction of idiographic methodologies where the focus shifts into the study of a series of phases of testing and social interaction with a variety of tasks, even going back into an understanding of the experiences that take place before the immediate context of the experimental context. The interest here is in the issue of the transfer of newly acquired knowledge from phase to phase, setting to setting, institutional frame to institutional frame, object to object and partner to partner (Tartas & Perret-Clermont, 2008; Zittoun & Perret-Clermont, 2009), and in this sense the original questions of the first generation of research about the outcomes of social interaction are brought again into the foreground, although with an enriched understanding of communication processes.

Perret-Clermont (Chapter 4) poses a crucial question: "What architectures of social relationships are supportive for the development of cooperative social skills, for the development of thinking, for mature citizenship?" Architecture is a term she borrowed from Rommetveit (1974), who used it in his studies of communication. The notion of "architecture" serves to point to the interpersonal, institutional, cultural and conversational implicits that prestructure an interaction and its communication contract. Perret-Clermont extends its use to encompass not only verbal acts and their intersubjectivity but any type of interpersonal transaction, including cooperation.

Keller (Chapter 3) describes the developmental sequence of sociomoral reasoning from childhood to adolescence in her "naïve theory of action" in a way that integrates cognitive, affective and behavioural aspects of the Self and Others' awareness (e.g. the ability to coordinate perspectives of the Self and Others, emotional concern for Others and action strategies). The ability to differentiate and coordinate perspectives of the Self and Others is seen as the core social-cognitive competence underlying the development of sociomoral thinking (Selman, 1980), a theme that is found in both Piaget (1932/1965; 1977/1995) and Mead (1934). The developmental sequence described by Keller is as follows. It starts from what is called a level 0 (egocentric focus on the perspective of the Self), to level 1 (differentiation of individual subjective perspectives), level 2 (coordination of the Self and Others' perspectives), level 3 (third-person or observer perspectives) and

level 4 (generalized social system perspectives). She shows that each higher-level coordination allows for more differentiated and coordinated categories of understanding the psychological world of both Self and Others.

Keller's level 2 coordination is similar to what Gillespie (Chapter 6; Gillespie & Cornish, 2010) describes as a coordination of metaperspectives, which are central to both communication and the emergence of human agency. This is reminiscent of what Rommetveit (1974) described as two interlocutors reaching a temporarily shared world, which was also identified by Psaltis & Duveen (2006; 2007) as the conversation type of "explicit recognition", which is directly linked not only to the cognitive progress for non-conservers who become conservers on a Piagetian conservation of liquids task but also to the use of novel arguments by them in subsequent post-tests (Psaltis, Chapter 5).

In his discussion of his first line of research, Psaltis also made clear that a big lacuna in both the Piagetian and the Vygotskian theories is the absence of an exploration of the role of social identity dynamics in cognitive developmental theory. In the empirical findings of the Cambridge strand of the third generation of research of social interaction and cognitive development there is clear and consistent evidence that both the establishment and the resolution of sociocognitive conflicts is formed under the influence of various sources of asymmetry in the classroom (developmental level, gender, academic reputation, popularity) that either conflict or align in social interaction. It is this sociocognitive conflict of asymmetries that productively structures the outcomes of the interaction at the individual level for children.

For example, a consistent finding is what was named the "Fm effect" (Psaltis & Duveen, 2006, 2007; Psaltis & Zapiti, 2014). This denotes a situation where a more developmentally advanced girl interacts with a less developmentally advanced boy. Under these conditions a more symmetrical discussion emerges which is the result of two sources of asymmetry in conflict (gender and developmental level) that result in the boy's resisting to be positioned as less knowledgeable. While in Piagetian terms this situation would probably be described as pseudoequilibrium (Piaget, 1977/1995) and not predictive of lasting consequences, the fact that the effect is found from early childhood to adolescence, and in various cognitive tasks, suggests that identity dynamics and status asymmetries should become an integral part of any cognitive developmental theory.

Part II

The role of social interaction in conflict transformation in the context of intergroup conflict was discussed by Psaltis (Chapter 5) in his second line of research and by all contributors to Part II. Psaltis' point of departure is the contact hypothesis and the reduction of prejudice (Allport, 1954), but he expands his outlook to the study of social representations of cooperation, conflict (Psaltis et al., 2014a), symbols (Psaltis et al., 2014b) and history (Psaltis et al., 2011; Psaltis, in press) in relation to reconciliation processes in post-conflict societies, studied in various age groups. One central characteristic of the work of Psaltis is his insistence on the need to capture the heterogeneity of social/national identity positions within a single society or "culture" (Psaltis, 2012a, 2012b) and their relationship to intergroup contact. This is a response to Duveen's (2007) call to study heterogeneity in social psychology and the recent critiques of the reification of culture (Duveen, 2008; Psaltis, 2012b) from the perspective of genetic social psychology. This move resonates with the re-evaluation of the ideas of cultural coherence and consistency on the part of several anthropologists, who maintain that analyses of any particular culture require attention to conflicts, diversity and transformations over time.

This line of research suggests that the field of social psychology studying intergroup contact needs to shift its attention to how these internal perspectives of a society interact within themselves and also with perspectives from other societies, thus multiplying the forms of interaction to be studied (Psaltis, 2012a, 2012b). It also points towards the need to study not only how social representations are reconstructed through microgenetic processes but also how social representations of contact itself and its valorization in the sociopolitical context moderate the effects of social interaction on reconciliation processes.

A critique of the way in which most research premised on Allport's (1954) contact hypothesis is currently done is also articulated by Gillespie (Chapter 6). He first argues that the literature has sought an essentialist theory of contact and thus neglected the broader (and usually quite diverse) contexts in which any social interaction is embedded. He is more interested in unearthing the dialogical processes that undermine the potential of intergroup contact to engender prejudice reduction. Gillespie expanded the original theorization of Moscovici (1976/2008) and his concept of "semantic barriers" as ways of representing the Other in such a way as to make what they do or say assimilated

into pre-existing representations and explicable, such that nothing that the other does or says demands a change in existing representations. In Piagetian terms, the words and actions of the Other are assimilated into existing knowledge structures, without any accommodation to the incoming information.

Gillespie underlines the importance of intergroup trust, suggesting that distrust is a powerful semantic barrier to genuine engagement with the perspective of the Other. In contrast, the existence of trust within a social interaction can be conceptualized as an openness to being changed by that social interaction. One theoretical point made by Gillespie with methodological repercussions for the study of intergroup contact is that when social scientists study an interaction, not only do they need to understand the context and process but they also need to understand what each party in the interaction thinks about themselves, each other and the interaction as a whole. That is to say, along with Perret-Clermont (Chapter 4) and Keller (Chapter 3), Gillespie is emphasizing the deeply intersubjective nature of both interpersonal and intergroup interaction.

Constantinou (Chapter 7) is also concerned with Self–Other relations in the context of conflict transformation. He argues that it is important to view conflict transformation and diplomacy not as a singular event or a top-down process but as a daily occurrence. His proposal is a way to transcend approaches that view diplomacy as merely an intergovernmental affair, as the management of interstate relations or as primarily the pursuit and negotiation of national interests.

This move by Constantinou resonates with the recent importance given in the field of international relations to understand the local at the grassroots beyond elitist notions of track one diplomacy. In his theorization the spiritual aspect is incorporated into conflict transformation through an example from the Cypriot context where an excerpt from a documentary film is discussed. For him this excerpt becomes a symbolic resource (see Zittoun, Chapter 8) to show how a spiritual leader elevates Self and Other to a spiritual realm of social interaction where both Self and Other are seen as creations of one and a single god, thus promoting reconciliation.

The unique emphasis of Constantinou is on the transformative potential of this homodiplomacy, whose mission is not only the knowledge and control of the Other but fundamentally the knowledge of the Self – and crucially this knowledge of the Self as a more reflective means of dealing with and transforming relations with Others. This transformation, as he writes, may take the route of sociocognitive conflict between

interlocutors reaching intersubjectivity, as explained by Perret-Clermont (Chapter 4), Gillespie (Chapter 6) and Psaltis (Chapter 5).

Given the recent global rise of militant Islamism, it is worth underlining the fact that Constantinou's proposal resonates with a notion that is found in Islamic diplomacy of the practice of the "greater jihad" (contrasted with the "lesser jihad" associated with military struggle and militant violence), which is a spiritual struggle seeking to stretch and break one's limited Self, or enemy within, as a means of critical discovery of the relationship between Self and Other, inducing a self-discovery or union with God. His proposal of the connection between Self and Other through the mediation and active imagination of either God, the unconscious or the inner stranger, nourished by various religious traditions and classical literature brings to light the importance of cultural objects as mediators between Self, Other and Object.

Sign mediation and its material repositories, such as novels and films, are theorized in more detail by Zittoun (Chapter 8), who argues that teaching-learning situations can lead to better recognition of the Other when they conjugate the meeting of two persons together with a cultural artefact, such as a novel or a film. Such cultural artefacts might then become symbolic resources that allow, through imagination, one to expand one's understanding and therefore overcome simplifying representations of the Other.

To understand how teaching-learning can bring recognition of the Other, or a reflection on one's relationship to the Other, one needs to consider the dynamic that takes place with and through cultural resources in their double mode of existence. These cultural artefacts become symbolic resources for the individual to the extent that they trigger imaginary experiences in people's development of a better understanding of Self and Otherness, in teaching-learning situations. But there are artefacts that can block conflict transformation functioning as semantic barriers, not to mention that they can even exacerbate conflict. Zittoun reminds us again of the destructive role of historical narratives in conflict and post-conflict societies. Mythical narratives of past and future (and even more so when they are instituted as religious discourses) are heavily emotional and value-laden. Consequently, when two groups hold contradictory "geographic imaginations" of a single place, these are generally mutually exclusive (Makriyianni & Psaltis, 2007; Psaltis et al., 2011). However, at the same time there is use of symbolic resources that can facilitate conflict transformation.

Cultural artefacts such as movies, games, books and philosophies are often used by adolescents in their efforts to think about alternative

worlds, hypothetical visions and strategies to transform the world. They are mobilized not only for what they actually represent but as a means to do something else: to reflect about oneself, to capture and understand one's emotions, or to understand better other people's actions in the world. Zittoun (2006) has shown that in daily life, people use symbolic resources in such a way that they might redefine their identity, learn new ways of doing things or confer a new sense to a given situation. For these reasons the use of symbolic resources also transforms Self–Other relationships.

Importantly, Zittoun claims that in the situation of teacher–student interactions, two different intersubjective dynamics take place. On the one hand, a "learning-teaching" asymmetrical relationship, as the teacher has more expertise in the texts than the students and can also transmit knowledge about them, and help them to develop specific skills. On the other hand, there is a symmetrical relationship in this situation since it is openly recognized by both that each participant has their own personal relationship of sense to that text (Zittoun, 2013).

Part III

The contributions to Part III by Uskul (Chapter 9), Downing Wilson and Cole (Chapter 10) and Passini (Chapter 11) offer the opportunity to reflect on the role of social relations mediating between material conditions (ecology, economy, land and property, financial downturn, tools and technology) and human development from social, cross-cultural and cultural psychological perspectives.

Uskul discussed how the economic environment affords different forms of social interdependence, and thereby also different ways of thinking and behaving. In particular, she shows how a certain economic activity and the resulting structure adopted in the groups practising this activity put constraints on the nature of their social relations and how this in turn influences cognitive and social psychological outcomes (and vice versa).

In her research programme she compared herders, farmers and fishermen in Turkey in relation to their cognitive abilities and the ways in which both adults and children responded to social exclusion. For example, farming often requires group collaboration, and farmers are tied to the land that they cultivate in fixed communities. In contrast, herding activities require less collaboration and rely on individual decision-making and autonomy. Farmers are found to exhibit a high degree of social interdependence, resulting in stronger emphasis on conformity,

consultation among members and collectivist action, higher degrees of compliance, conscientiousness and conservatism in child-rearing practices. In their cognitive patterns they show a greater tendency to perceive objects not in terms of their uniqueness but in terms of their larger social context (Berry, 1966). This finding seems to be aligned with Nisbett's findings that collectivistic orientations are related to holistic perceptual tendencies, while members of North American cultures with relatively independent and individualistic orientations show analytic perceptual tendencies (Nisbett, 2003).

Uskul's findings support the prediction that economic activities requiring a higher level of social interdependence are associated with holistic cognitive tendencies (Uskul et al., 2008). These empirical findings could be linked directly to Piagetian predictions provided that Piaget is not read as the individualist stage theorist, as was the case back in the 1970s and 1980s (Psaltis & Zapiti, 2014). Unfortunately, this misreading of Piagetian theory (Hsueh, 2009) obstructed the theorists, who in the past tested Piagetian theory in a cross-cultural context (Greenfield, 1966) from recognizing the central role of Piagetian social relations of cooperation in the societies and particular context studied as the relational form that was promoting the achievement of concrete operations, even if their empirical findings were interpretable in that way (for an extended discussion of this point, see Psaltis & Zapiti, 2014).

Uskul's findings are a step towards this recognition in that the importance of interdependence is recognized within a single cultural context, but we feel that there is a need for further refinement of the various meanings of interdependence in relation to what Piaget described as social relations of constraint and social relations of cooperation. Having said this, Uskul's exploration of the extent to which the pursued economic activity requires reliance on strangers (individuals outside one's immediate social circle) and the consequence of this for human development open up a window to extend the Piagetian theory by exploring the difference between the formation of cooperative relations in a familiar circle vs. cooperative relations with a widened circle of social relations that includes strangers and outgroupers, not to mention the traditional "enemies".

The theme of intergroup relations and contact with "strangers" was simulated in the innovative method proposed by Downing Wilson & Cole (Chapter 10), who transpose Bartlett's method (Moscovici, 1990) of studying social representations to the microgenetic field. They achieve this by studying the intragroup and intergroup dynamics of two contrasting idiocultures as they were formed and came into contact. The

use of the simulation showed how people create social worlds and actively shape their own development in turn through their own creations, a process that Valsiner (1999) once aptly termed: "I create you to control me."

From a methodological point it also points to the need for what in the past Psaltis, Duveen and Perret-Clermont (2009) called an "experimental ethnography" (cf. Maynard, 2009) that resonates with Sherif's Robbers Cave Experiment, where some basic constraints on the proximal context of the interactions are set by the researchers, but then the dialogue, relationships, values and norms are left to emerge freely within the social interactive context so that their consequences can be explored both immediately and long after the social interaction at the individual level.

The set of values and the goals of the two experimentally induced idiocultures of Stones and Traders (communitarianism vs. personal achievement) resonate with the basic distinctions made by classical sociologists such as Durkheim, who discussed mechanical and organic solidarity or Tonnies (1887/1957), with his distinction between *Gemeinshaft* (community) and *Gesellshaft* (society) and the cross-cultural literature of collectivism vs. individualism discussed by Uskul (Chapter 9). As we saw in the Introduction, Greenfield (2009) discusses the transition between the two as predictive of changes in the values of societies, the learning environments and finally the cognitive abilities of the children in this society. However, Downing Wilson and Cole (Chapter 10) avoid any explicit valorization of one culture over the other, and their descriptions of each group, Stoners and Traders, do not directly map onto the configurations discussed by Greenfield and classical sociologists. In one sense they are doing what Moscovici called anthropology of modern societies (Moscovici, 1990). From the standpoint of values, both groups are polyphasic and the authors challenge the traditional distinctions on purpose. The Stoners idioculture is characterized as a benevolent matriarchy where warmth, affection, close interpersonal relationships, politeness and tolerance were valued above all else while being greedy and materialistic was frowned upon. However, respect for, or even conformity to, the tradition was also a value for this group, as we would expect from traditional societies.

As Downing Wilson & Cole (Chapter 10) discuss in their epilogue, their findings resonate with the processes described by Gillespie (Chapter 6) and Zittoun (Chapter 8). They see their simulation results as strongly arguing for cultural historical mediation as a central process in the creation of assimilation, as ordinarily conceived in the Piagetian literature. However, Downing Wilson and Cole term this

process appropriation (not internalization), which they see as a culturally mediated, dialogic process. This was seen when intergroup conflict between the two idiocultures made its presence felt: the role of play money as either currency or object of art, and the meaning of the word "grandma" as either a beloved family member or a way of expressing disapproval with another's actions. In both cases we witness the transformation of a social representation (money or family relation) in terms of the meaning system of the receiving culture. In this case "the meaning of the token is inflected to fit the nature of the interaction between the groups" (Downing Wilson & Cole, Chapter 10).

The semiotic processes around the material aspect of money in society in relation to intergroup dynamics and the escalation of intergroup conflicts in times of financial crises is clearly and convincingly presented by Passini (Chapter, 11). He draws on classical social psychological theories of intergroup relations and a critique of consumerism to show the repercussions of the economic crisis on social relations and social interaction.

Drawing on similarities with the situation of the Weimar Republic in the early 1930s, Passini identifies three consequences of the economic crisis (relative deprivation, distrust in the institutions in office and the search for security) that in turn result in an increase in prejudicial attitudes and intolerant social relations that could have a cumulative effect in bringing people to blindly and uncritically support populist, xenophobic, nationalist, extremist and even fascist movements as we currently see in Greece, France, Italy and various other countries of the EU and beyond. For instance, in the aftermath of the 2001 terrorist attack in the USA, many citizens supported government efforts to promote security as opposed to protecting individual liberties and civil rights that led to the violation of human rights at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base. A worrying finding reported by Passini is that an apolitical stance and an indifference towards political issues are empirically also related to prejudicial attitudes and behaviours. His results show that indifferent people are characterized by authoritarian and conformist attitudes, as well as by high scores on subtle forms of prejudice towards immigrants.

Finally, in Passini's discussion of consumerism as a major problem of Western individualist societies, he engages with the notion of responsibility "for Other" and its changing nature. In line with Bauman (2007) he sees a new concept of responsibility emerging from individualism that does not include Others but it is only referred to self-realization. That is, the individual is left alone with the reponsibility to care for himself or herself and not asked to be responsible to care for others.

We are also reminded that Piaget (1932/1965) made a similar distinction between two forms of responsibility: objective and subjective. Objective responsibility is a strict adherence to rules with no reflection on their sense and it characterizes relations of constraint between individuals. In contrast, subjective responsibility is based on a reflective capacity focused more on the spirit than on the letter of the law, and it characterizes cooperative relations. As Piaget (1932/1965) showed, egocentric tendencies in the child are supported by social relations of constraint and both are two forms of disequilibrium. In one, the Self dominates the group or assimilates the group to the Self, whereas in the other the group imposes its will on the Self or assimilates the individual. For Piaget, social relations of cooperation were, again, the equilibrated ideal. Similarly, Passini suggests overcoming the consequences of the economic crisis by promoting cooperative forms of solidarity and pro-social protest.

Concluding remarks: Understanding both stability and change in human and societal development

To return to the global perspective of the international community on societal and human development, a major point of critique, in light of the contributions to this volume, is its outcome-oriented outlook, which is plagued by the same problem that Valsiner (2007) identifies in developmental psychology, which ends up "non-developmental" due to the lack of focus on the actual processes of development.

It could be argued that a lack of understanding of the complex sociogenetic and ontogenetic changes that correspond to the complexification of society (technical changes, globalization, pluralism of ideas and worldviews, scientific advances, world wars, migrations, social changes, climate change and religious fanaticism) is what contributed to cultural relativism and post-modernism, often resulting in the dangerous attitude of "everything goes". If people don't have rich/sophisticated enough symbolic resources to deal with these complex issues, they tend to reduce them in a dangerous way to binary problems (good/evil; black/white; friend/enemy; ingroup/outgroup), resulting in dangerous binary thinking and the emergence of destructive conflict. Having said this, complexification per se should not be equated with having good intentions.

In order to offer a comprehensive theoretical framework that captures bidirectional changes at various levels of analysis and articulates microgenetic, ontogenetic and sociogenetic changes, Gerard Duveen's

vision of a genetic social psychology could be a useful guiding framework (Zittoun et al., 2003; Moscovici et al., 2013; Psaltis & Zapiti, 2014). This vision of Duveen was characterized by Valsiner (2013, p. ix) as "The idea that will live" because, as he argued, the life work of the late Gerard Duveen is "a good illustration of what kind of scholarship could bring psychology out of its crisis of limited generalization value" (Valsiner, 2013, p. ix). Moscovici (2010) stated about the work of Duveen that it inspired some of his writings also (see Moscovici, 1990) and that Duveen "had been able to raise fundamental epistemological questions and to propose some elements of answer on which we must reflect further" (p. 2.4).

As Duveen would argue, every child is born in a thinking society that is already structured by social representations (Moscovici, 1976/2008) about everything, including those social representations that institute as meaningful "objects" categories such as "intelligence", "gender", "social class" and "ethnicity". These social representations furnish positions of identity (Duveen, 2001), mapping Self-object-Other configurations, and they are the result of a balance of social influence from various sources. Representations of this thinking society are characterized by both stability and change, and they are dependent on the ideological, political and economic struggles for domination in society. They can best be understood as representational projects (Bower & Gaskell, 2008) of various groups (actual or virtual) that differ, depending on where the ethical horizons of the group are drawn in attempting to determine who is included and who is excluded from the community or the group (Gillespie et al., 2012; Psaltis, 2012a, 2012b). Such representational projects often take place in culture zones of contact such as those of immigration, migration, globalization, communication in the public sphere and the social media. Such situations take dramatic forms in case of a financial crisis or conflict, as we have seen in this volume. This kind of contact certainly creates a feeling of uncertainty and loss in continuity that leads to anxiety in the individual (O'Sullivan Lago et al., 2008). However, responses could be both positive transformations, such as developing a multicultural identity, or negative, simply by rejecting change in a way that escalates conflict (Gillespie, Chapter 6).

As we have seen, practices that differ in their structure can be located within communities of varying size, and they are supported by different configurations of the Self-other-Object that can take the form of cooperative, competitive, asymmetrical or symmetrical social relationships. Interpersonal, public communication (Moscovici, 1976/2008) is the main vehicle bringing the various perspectives on values and criteria

for exclusion and inclusion (Kadianaki, 2014) into contact. Contact can be intragroup or intergroup but it entails a sociocognitive conflict (Doise et al., 1976) that can lead to sociogenetic changes through microgenesis, which is seen as the motor of both ontogenetic and sociogenetic change (Duveen & Lloyd, 1990).

Sociocognitive conflict is a necessary condition because it can introduce doubt and reflection in the correctness of Self's understanding (Duveen, 2002) but it is not a sufficient condition for microgenetic change. This is seen by the fact that sociocognitive conflict does not always result in the transformation of social representations. More important are the modalities of its resolution and the conversation types (Psaltis & Duveen, 2006,2007) formed in external dialogue, as well as the employment of various semantic barriers (Gillespie, 2008, 2011) or symbolic resources (Zittoun, 2006) in internal dialogue that can undermine the coordination of opposing perspectives. The motivation to notice and overcome the sociocognitive conflict is very important. People are often more concerned about giving meaning to the emotions that they experience and making sense of the changes that happen (crisis, new relationships and other transitions) than with rational understanding. Who am I? Who will demonstrate solidarity if I/we run into problems? What is my agency? Can I secure my future? Can I/we be proud of our past? These are existential questions that need respect and security to be confronted in a non-violent way. How are young people socialized into the practices of dealing with these questions that are not only cognitive practices?

The relationship of these various groups and individuals with material resources and power is important because it is the one that determines their perceived status (majority or minority) in society and how much they have a voice in the public sphere (Moscovici, 1976). The triadic configurations of control (Psaltis, 2005a) between Self-Other-object take the form of expectations about who owns or should own and control these various resources but also creates opportunities for resistance (Duveen, 2001). As such they are sustained by feelings of relative deprivation, often leading to collective action for the benefit of the ingroup or even conflict with outgroups. They also canalize the form of social interactions and career paths around objects of knowledge, as is the case with gender and various cognitive tasks in the fields of science, technology, engineering and mathematics, for example.

A useful way to think about the various groups contesting in the public arena, based on the present discussion, is to think of a matrix defined by two dimensions. One dimension is the value orientation of

groups in relation to the inclusiveness of their ethical horizon (Psaltis, 2012a). In the post-conflict and divided society of Cyprus, for example, the three dominant positions are reconciliation, communitarian and ethnonationalist. Kelman and Hamilton (1989) similarly discuss more generally value, role and rule orientations for less conflictual societies. More refined differentiations might even be possible where the ethical horizon is gradually widened, starting from care for the interest of the Self only to care for the ingroup, to care for allies, to care for both ingroups and outgroups, to care for humanity and finally care for all species and the environment. The second dimension could be based on who social interaction is taking place with for the formation of these value orientations, starting from self-reflexive thought to close relatives, friends, acquaintances, strangers and even "enemies". The crossing of these dimensions produces various configurations of contact and collective action at various levels of actual and projected inclusion or exclusion. Such a conceptualization of collective action is important since it departs from the narrow definition of it in most of the current discussions in social psychology (Van Zomeren et al., 2008).

To return to the developmental narrative, the newborn will slowly develop its representations of Self, objects and Other in their thinking society, at first equipped with the bare minimum of some reflexes and the help of its caregivers who are already active conforming or resisting actors in this thinking society. Through interaction with objects and Others, children will slowly develop their cognitive, affective and relational capacities. Material deprivation of the parents in these early age groups makes children's health and development particularly vulnerable (UNDP, 2014).

In the process of human development, as Perret-Clermont (Chapter 4) argues, cognitive and social processes scaffold each other and there is no gain in confusing them as "two sides of the same coin". She suggests a spiral of development from individual capabilities or mastery of certain symbolic resources to social interaction and back. A similar spiral of development was proposed by Psaltis & Zapiti (2014) in relation to cognitive development, and Martin & Gillespie (2010) from a Meadian perspective in relation to the emergence of agency.

The increasing diameter of the spiral directly refers to the increasing differentiation and coordination of the relation between Subject-Object and Subject-Other. The fact that a spiral passes through the same point in an expanded form indicates that every stage or period of development is premised on the reflection of the previous one on a higher plane and that previously achieved capacities become functionally integrated in

the new plane. For Piaget (1964/1968) the relationships between subject and object were crucial in his genetic epistemology programme, also inspiring Moscovici's theorizing on minority influence and social representations (Duveen, 2001; Psaltis, 2005b).

In every single stage of development, these relationships are changing. In the beginning the infant does not differentiate Subject from Object and lives in an undifferentiated whole (although, of course, other people, such as the parents, do differentiate the child from the social and physical environment). Object permanence after the first year of life means that the Subject is recognized as an object, and the same goes for the perception of Others in their environment (Piaget, 1964/1968). Here there is a congruence between the work of Piaget and Mead (cf., Piaget, 1965/1968, p. 72 fn. 18). In Mead's terminology, as the child begins to differentiate between Self and Other, and differentiate between different types of Other, then their psychology becomes increasingly complex and social. Higher mental functions and complex language abilities arise with this internalized play of perspectives (Martin & Gillespie, 2010).

With the appearance of language after two years of life, the child has the chance to reconstitute their past actions and anticipate future actions through verbal representations. This also opens up the social world of social interaction for the child and the world of representations that they have to master. While the hands enable the child to act on the physical environment, words enable them to act not only on the social environment but also on their own thoughts and feelings. Thus language transforms development and thought to the extent that it leads to new actions and a mastery over the ability to recall past actions (Vygotsky & Luria, 1931/1994).

The use of language means that children are open to the vast world of collective concepts and the child's words can refer to past, present and future acts so that acts can also be performed with words. However, due to the unconscious egocentrism of children in this period, they are often vulnerable to assimilating others in their own perspective. In this transitional period, social interaction plays a crucial role in driving the formation of concrete operational structures. This is the period when the interplay between social identity dynamics and the negotiation of knowledge is more clearly seen in the dynamics of social interaction (Psaltis & Zapiti, 2014). Social representations of gender, for example, are symbolic resources for children but without the children reflectively grasping the effect of gender dynamics on social interaction.

After 6–7 years, the children can engage in real cooperation, which is premised on an understanding of, and coordination with, the

perspective of the Other. In this period, children also start playing games with rules that entail certain common obligations. Play and games are evident in all human cultures (Edwards, 2000), and they have been argued to be the basis for the emergence of perspective-taking (Bruner, Jolly & Sylva, 1976). Specifically, Mead (1934) argued that games hold the key to the development of perspective-taking. Unlike play, games entail structured rules with distinct social positions (i.e. hider/seeker, doctor/patient, winner/loser, attacker/defender, etc.), and the rules of the game usually entail children moving between these social positions. Building upon Mead, it has been argued that this physical moving between social positions is the developmental precursor to the psychological movement between perspectives (Gillespie, 2006). The key point here is that by physically moving into the social position, or role, of the Other, children gain externality on themselves; they become Other and, in so doing, they come to see their former behaviour from the outside. To become a self-reflective actor, Mead argued, entails becoming Other to oneself – that is, approaching oneself from the outside. Exchanging social positions within games (and in other activities) (Gillespie & Martin, 2014) is one mechanism through which we become Other to ourselves – that is, self-reflective.

A bit later, around 9–10 years of age, it is possible that they attain a reflective grasp of how gender or social identities are indeed influencing their social interactions, so more distance is inserted between social interaction and themselves. However, there is an indication that social identity dynamics go underground (Psaltis & Zapiti, 2014) – they become internalized, as Vygotsky (1934/1986) would say – when thinking alone in the post-interaction period.

After 12 years of age, children are probably in a position to take a system perspective through engaging in complex forms of perspective-taking (e.g. metaperspectives and metametaperspectives). This is when they start reflecting on social relations of cooperation vs. social relations of constraint in a more generalized form, pondering about their consequences on their own learning and the learning of others. There is evidence that formal operational thinking is greatly facilitated by the social interaction of individuals with strangers and outgroupers, and specifically from a reflective rejection of social relations of constraint between groups in society (Kyriakidou-Kranou, 2013).

Engaging with the "as if" and hypothetical is a characteristic of formal operational thinking and flexible use of symbolic resources (Zittoun, 2006), experimenting with virtual worlds and world views, ideologies for transforming or even conserving the values of their society,

which entails reflective resistance or conformity to various differentiated positions in the thinking society described earlier. These positions are structured quite early on from children in implicit and non-reflective ways that structure their microgenetic and ontogenetic processes from the first day of their lives.

References

Allport, G. (1954). *The nature of prejudice*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Bauer, M. W. & Gaskell, G. (2008). Social representations theory: a progressive research programme for social psychology. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, 38(4), 335–353.

Bauman, Z. (2007). *Consuming life*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

Berry, J. W. (1966). Temne and Eskimo perceptual skills. *International Journal of Psychology*, 1, 207–229.

Bruner, J. S., Jolly, A. & Sylva, K. (Eds.). (1976). *Play: Its role in development and evolution*. New York: Basic Books.

Burman, E. (2008a). *Deconstructing developmental psychology* 2nd revised edition London: Routledge.

Burman, E. (2008b). *Developments: Child, image, nation*. London: Routledge.

Carretero, M. (2011). *Constructing patriotism. Teaching history and memories in global worlds*. Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publisher.

Cooper, M., Chak, A., Cornish, F. & Gillespie, A. (2012). Dialogue: Bridging personal, community, and social transformation. *Journal of Humanistic Psychology*, 53, 70–93.

Crouzevialle, M. & Butera, F. (2012). Performance-approach goals deplete working memory and impair cognitive performance. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General*, 142(3), 666–678.

Doise, W. (1986). *Levels of explanation in social psychology: European monographs in social psychology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Editions de la maison des Sciences de l'Homme.

Doise, W., Mugny, G. & Perret-Clermont, A. N. (1976). Social interaction and cognitive development: Further evidence. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 6, 245–247.

Duveen, G. & Lloyd, B. (1990). Introduction. In G. Duveen & B. Lloyd (Eds.), *Social representations and the development of knowledge* (pp. 1–10). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Duveen, G. & Psaltis, C. (2008). The constructive role of asymmetries in social interaction. In U. Mueller, J. Carpendale, N. Budwig & B. Sokol (Eds.), *Social life and social knowledge: Toward a process account of development* (pp. 183–204). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Duveen, G. (2001). Representations, identity, resistance. In K. Deaux & G. Philogene (Eds.), *Representations of the social* (pp. 257–284). Oxford: Blackwell.

Duveen, G. (2007). Culture and social representations. In J. Valsiner & A. Rosa (Eds.), *The Cambridge handbook of socio-cultural psychology* (pp. 543–559). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Duveen, G. (2008). Social actors and social groups: A return to heterogeneity in social psychology. *Journal of the Theory of Social Behavior*, 38, 369–374.

Duveen, G. & Lloyd, B. (1990). Introduction. In G. Duveen & B. LLoyd (Eds.), *Social representations and the development of knowledge* (pp. 1–10). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Edelstein, W. (1999). The cognitive context of historical change: Assimilation, accommodation, and the segmentation of competence. In E. Turiel (Ed.), *Developmental and cultural change: Reciprocal processes* (pp. 5–17). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Edwards, C. P. (2000). Children's play in cross-cultural perspective: A new look at the Six Cultures study. *Cross-Cultural Research*, 34(4), 318–338.

Gillespie, A. & Cornish, F. (2010). Intersubjectivity: Toward a dialogical analysis. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, 40, 19–46.

Gillespie, A. (2006). Games and the development of perspective taking. *Human Development*, 49(2), 87–92.

Gillespie, A. (2008). Social representations, alternative representations and semantic barriers. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, 38, 376–391.

Gillespie, A. (2011). Contact without transformation: The context, process and content of distrust. In Ivana Marková & Alex Gillespie (Eds.), *Trust and conflict: Representation, culture and dialogue* (pp.201–216). London: Routledge.

Gillespie, A. & Martin, J. (2014). Position exchange theory: A socio-material basis for discursive and psychological positioning. *New Ideas in Psychology, 32*, 73–79.

Gillespie, A. & Zittoun, T. (2010). Using resources: Conceptualizing the mediation and reflective use of tools and signs. *Culture & Psychology*, 16(1), 37–62.

Gillespie, A., Howarth, C. & Cornish, F. (2012). Four problems for researchers using social categories. *Culture & Psychology*, 18(3), 391–402.

Greco Morasso, S., Miserez-Caperos, C. & Perret-Clermont, A.-N. (in press). L'argumentation à visée cognitive chez les enfants. Une étude exploratoire sur les dynamiques argumentatives et psychosociales. In N. Muller Mirza & C. Buty (Eds.), *Argumentation dans les contextes de l'éducation*. Bern: Peter Lang.

Greenfield, P. M. (1966). On culture and conservation. In J. S. Bruner, R. R. Olver, and P. M. Greenfield (Eds), *Studies in cognitive growth* (pp. 225–256). New York: Wiley.

Greenfield, P. M. (2009). Linking social change and developmental change: Shifting pathways of human development. *Developmental Psychology*, 45, 401–418.

Hsueh, Y. (2009). Piaget in the United States, 1925–1971. In U. Müller, J. Carpendale & L. Smith (Eds), *The Cambridge companion to Piaget* (pp. 344–370). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Hundeide, K. (1991). *Helping disadvantaged children: Psycho-social intervention and aid to disadvantaged children in Third World countries*. Søreidgrende London: Sigma Forl; J. Kingsley.

Hundeide, K. (2004). A new identity, a new lifestyle. In A.-N. Perret-Clermont, C. Pontecorvo, L. Resnick, T. Zittoun & B. Burge (Eds.), *Joining society. Social interaction and learning in adolescence and youth* (pp. 86–108). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Inglehart, R. F. & Welzel, C. (2003). The theory of human development: A cross-cultural analysis. *European Journal of Political Research*, 42(3), 341–379.

Kitchener, R. F. (2009). Piaget's genetic epistemology. *International Philosophical Quarterly*, 20(4), 377–405.

Makriyianni, C. & Psaltis, C. (2007). History teaching and reconciliation. *Cyprus Review*, 19, 43–69.

Maynard A. E. (2009). Context and structure in social interaction and cognitive development: Commentary on Psaltis, Duveen, and Perret-Clermont, *Human Development*, 52, 313–319.

Mead, G. H. (1934). *Mind, self, and society*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Moscovici, S. (1976/2008). *Psychoanalysis, its image and its public*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Moscovici, S. (1990). Social psychology and developmental psychology: Extending the conversation. In G. Duveen and B. Lloyd (Eds.) *Social representations and the development of knowledge* (pp. 164–185). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Moscovici, S. (2010). Let us not forget to think, nor the thinkers! *Papers on Social Representations*, 19, 1.1–2.4. Retrieved from http://www.psych.lse.ac.uk/psr/.

Moscovici, S. Jovchelovitch, S. & Wagoner, B. (Eds.) (2013). *Development as a social process: Contributions of Gerard Duveen*. UK: Routledge.

Nisbett, R. E. (2003). *The geography of thought: How Asians and Westerners think differently... and why*. New York: The Free Press.

O'Sullivan, R., de Abreu, G. & Burgess, M. (2008). "I am a human being like you": An identification strategy to maintain continuity in a cultural contact zone. *Human Development*, 51(5–6), 349–367.

Perret, J.-F. & Perret-Clermont, A.-N. (2011). *Apprentice in a changing trade*. (N. Emler, Trans.). Charlotte, N.C. USA: Information Age Publishing.

Perret-Clermont, A. N. (1993). What is it that develops? *Cognition and Instruction*, 3–4, 197–205.

Piaget, J. (1977/1995). *Sociological studies* (T. Bown et al. Trans.). London: Routledge.

Piaget, J. (1932/1965). *The moral judgment of the child*. London: Routledge.

Piaget, J. (1964/1968). *Six psychological studies*. UK: University of London Press.

Psaltis, C. & Duveen, G. (2006). Social relations and cognitive development: The influence of conversation types and representations of gender. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 36, 407–430.

Psaltis, C. & Duveen, G. (2007). Conversation types and conservation: Forms of recognition and cognitive development. *British Journal of Developmental Psychology*, 25, 79–102.

Psaltis, C. & Zapiti, A. (2014). *Interaction, communication and development: psychological development as a social process*. UK: Routledge.

Psaltis, C. (2005a). *Social Relations and Cognitive Development: The Influence of Conversation Types and Representations of Gender*. Unpublished PhD thesis. University of Cambridge.

Psaltis, C. (2005b). Communication and the construction of knowledge or transmission of belief: The role of conversation type and behavioral style. *Studies in Communication Sciences*, 5, 209–228.

Psaltis, C. (2007). International collaboration as construction of knowledge and its constraints. *Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science*, 41, 187–197.

Psaltis, C. (2012a). Intergroup trust and contact in transition: A social representations perspective on the Cyprus conflict. In I. Markova & A. Gillespie (Ed.), *Trust and Conflict: Representations, Culture and Dialogue* (pp. 83–104), UK: Routledge.

Psaltis, C. (2012b). Culture and social representations: A continuing dialogue in search for heterogeneity in social developmental psychology. *Culture & Psychology*, 18(3), 375–390.

Psaltis, C., Duveen, G. & Perret-Clermont, A. N. (2009). The social and the psychological: Structure and Context in Intellectual Development. *Human Development*, 52, 291–312.

Psaltis, C., Cabrera, C., Lytra, E., Filippou, G., Cakal, H. & Makriyianni, C. (2014). Oral history accounts of the former inhabitants of mixed villages in Cyprus: A social representations perspective. In H. Briel (Ed.), *Oral history in Cyprus* (pp.34–50). Nicosia: University of Nicosia Press.

Psaltis, C., Lytras, E., Costache, S. & Fisher, C. (2011). Methodology, epistemology and ideology of history educators across the divide in cyprus. In L. Perikleous & Shemilt, D. (Eds.), *The future of the past: Why history education matters* (pp.343–386) Nicosia: AHDR.

Psaltis, C., Beydola, T., Filippou, G. & Vrachimis, N. (2014). Contested symbols as social representations: The case of Cyprus. In P. R. Dezalia & S. Moeschberger (Eds.) *Symbols that bind, symbols that divide: The semiotics of peace and conflict* (pp.61–89). USA: Springer.

Pulfrey, C. & Butera, F. (2013). Why neoliberal values of self-enhancement lead to cheating in Higher Education: A motivational account. *Psychological Science*, 24(11), 2153–2162. doi: 10.1177/0956797613487221.

Pulfrey, C., Buchs, C. & Butera, F. (2011). Why grades engender performance-avoidance goals: The mediating role of autonomous motivation. *American Psychological Association*, 103(3), 683–700. doi: 10.1037/a0023911.

Rommetveit, R. (1974). *On message structure: A framework for the study of language and communication*. London: Wiley.

Selman, R. (1980). *The growth of interpersonal understanding: developmental and clinical analyses*. London: Academic Press.

Sinclaire-Harding, L., Miserez, C., Arcidiacono, F. & Perret-Clermont, A.-N. (2013). Argumentation in the Piagetian clinical interview: A step further in dialogism. In M. B. Ligorio & M. César (Eds.), *The interplays between dialogical learning and dialogical self* (pp. 53–82). Charlotte: Information Age Publisher.

Stephan, W. G. & Stephan, C. W. (1985). Intergroup anxiety. *Journal of Social Issues*, 41, 157–176.

Tartas, V. & Perret-Clermont, A. N. (2008). Socio-cognitive dynamics in dyadic interaction: How do you work together to solve Kohs cubes? *European Journal of Developmental Psychology*, 5, 561–584.

Toma, C. & Butera, F. (2009). Hidden profiles and concealed information: Strategic information sharing and use in group decision making. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 35(6), 793–806.

Tönnies, F. (1887/1957). *Community and society* (C. P. Loomis, Ed. & Trans.). East Lansing: Michigan State University Press.

UNDP (2010). Human Development Report 2010: *The real wealth of nations: pathways to human development*. New York.

UNDP (2014). *Sustaining human progress: Reducing vulnerabilities and building resilience*. New York.

Uskul, A. K., Kitayama, S. & Nisbett, R. N. (2008). Ecocultural basis of cognition: Farmers and fishermen are more holistic than herders. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA*, 105, 8552–8556.

Valsiner, J. (1999). I create you to control me: A glimpse into basic processes of semiotic mediation. *Human Development*, 42, 26–30.

Valsiner, J. (2007). *Culture in minds and societies: Foundations of cultural psychology*. New Delhi: Sage.

Van Zomeren, M., Postmes, T. & Spears, R. (2008). Toward an integrative social identity model of collective action: A quantitative research synthesis of three socio-psychological perspectives. *Psychological Bulletin*, 134, 504–535.

Vygotsky, L. (1934/1986). *Thought and language* (A. Kozulin, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Vygotsky, L. S. & Luria, A. (1994). Tool and symbol in child development. In R. Van de Veer & J. Valsiner (Eds.), *The Vygotsky reader* (pp. 99–174). Oxford: Blackwell.

Zittoun, T. (2006). *Transitions. Development through symbolic resources*. Greenwich, CT: InfoAge.

Zittoun, T. (2013). On the use of a film: Cultural experiences as symbolic resources. In A. Kuhn (Ed.), *Little madnesses: Winnicott, transitional phenomena and cultural experience* (pp. 135147). London: Tauris.

Zittoun, T. & Perret-Clermont, A.-N. (2009). Four social psychological lenses for psychology of learning and development. *European Journal of Psychology of Education*, 24(3), 387–403.

Zittoun, T., Duveen, G., Gillespie, A., Ivinson, G. & Psaltis, C. (2003). The use of symbolic resources in developmental transitions. *Culture & Psychology*, 9, 415–448.

Zittoun, T., Cornish, F., Gillespie, A. & Psaltis, C. (2007). The metaphor of the triangle in theories of human development. *Human Development*, 50, 208–229.